

27 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN MOORE -

The following comments are submitted on your memo. serial 02350D of 22 March 1945.

(I suggest that the policies herein commented upon be circulated to planning agencies concerned for their views. The completed paper on each subject will then contain the necessary information on that subject to be included in the Navy Post-War Plan.)

Problem

The determination of tasks to be assigned the Coast Guard in the event of war or national emergency.

Decision

In the event of war or national emergency, the following tasks shall be assigned to the Coast Guard by the Navy.

- a. To continue all peace time tasks, modified as necessary to meet the needs of the military situation.
- b. To protect merchant vessels and port facilities from damage due to sabotage.
- c. To arrest and remove merchant crews who might menace the war effort.
- d. To train officers and men for the Merchant Marine.
- e. To establish and maintain war beach patrols and coastal lookout systems.
- f. To establish and maintain stations and vessels for the collection of weather data as required by war operations.
- g. Assist the Navy
 - (1) In convoy operations.
 - (2) In patrol, both surface and air.
 - (3) In the installation and maintenance of aids to navigation in forward and combat areas, including the maintenance of secret channels, mine fields, and means of fixing navigational positions.
 - (4) In operations in heavy ice areas.
 - (5) In manning of landing craft.
- h. To assist the Army and Navy in air-sea rescue operations.
- i. To perform such other tasks within the capabilities and limitations of the Coast Guard as are ordered by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Discussion

In considering the assignment of war time tasks to the Coast Guard, it must be kept in mind that:

- a. The Coast Guard exists to perform its civil functions of law enforcement and maritime safety. In peace time, it has the responsibility of maintaining its personnel and facilities in readiness to take its place in the Navy in the event of war or national emergency.

b. In peace time, the Navy has no authoritative control over the preparation of the Coast Guard for its war time duties.

c. During the present war the Coast Guard has manned many naval vessels. This is not a normal war function of the Coast Guard, but resulted from an excess in the Coast Guard of personnel recruited and trained for port security, beach patrol, and small boat coastal control.

d. In war time, the Coast Guard continued to be the principal maritime law enforcement and safety agency of the Federal Government, but its civil functions are usually subordinated to military functions.

e. Even though the Coast Guard comes into the Navy in time of war, it is not considered part of the Naval Establishment in any international treaties.

f. The principal tasks for which the Coast Guard is specially trained to perform are:

- (1) Federal law enforcement upon the high seas and the navigable waters of the United States and its territories. Among these are included the protection of fisheries and game in Alaskan and other waters, civil law enforcement in Alaska, immigration, anchorage and other laws relating to navigable waters.
- (2) Law enforcement resulting from international agreements and treaties, such as the Whaling Treaty Act, the North Pacific Halibut Act, and the protection of seals.
- (3) Safeguarding life and property at sea and upon the inland waters of the United States and its territories. Under this the Coast Guard maintains:
 - (i) vessels on patrol
 - (ii) lifesaving stations supplemented by rescue vessels and aircraft
 - (iii) medical aid to and evacuation of crews of vessels at sea
 - (iv) personnel and equipment to assist in flood and hurricane relief operations
 - (v) aids to navigation, including the International Ice Patrol, ice-breaking, and collection of data for the Weather Bureau
 - (vi) agencies for the inspection of merchant vessels, and licensing and certification of their officers and crews.This also includes, approval and inspection of lifesaving

and firefighting equipment, enforcement of discipline on
merchant vessels, and the investigation of marine casualties.
(vii) agencies to regulate safety standards of yachts and other
non-commercial vessels.

g. In general the difference between the peace time and war time tasks
of the Coast Guard differ only in emphasis and objectives.

Problem

To determine whether or not to assign air components to vessels in Inactive Status.

Decision

Air components are not assigned to vessels in Inactive Status.

Five carrier groups complete with airplanes and equipment and manned to 20% complement shall be maintained at shore stations and earmarked for embarkation on carriers to be placed in full commission from Inactive Status.

Discussion

In general, vessels in Inactive Status are not assigned personnel. They are maintained in a proper state of preservation and readiness by Commanders of Reserve Fleets. That Commander has personnel necessary for ship keepers, and for all work necessary for the preservation of all ships and equipment under his care. This personnel is not necessarily assigned to any ship, but is employed on any of the ships for which he is responsible as necessary.

Thus, no air components are assigned to vessels or aircraft in Inactive Status, but air components are assigned to Reserve Fleets for the maintenance of aircraft and equipment of the Naval Aeronautical Organization.

It is expected that certain carriers in Inactive Status will be available for active duty within 30 days. Unless nucleus personnel and the airplanes and their equipment are maintained in a semi-readiness condition, it seems probable that the ship can be gotten ready before the air group is available.

For economy, the number of such air groups must be at a minimum. For planning purposes the initial number is five. Also, for economy, 20% complement is prescribed.

The airplanes and equipment will be kept sufficiently up-to-date for effective war operations within 30 days. The personnel will be required to maintain their equipment, including the airplanes, and to conduct limited simulated carrier operations.

Selected reserve personnel will be ordered to these air groups for refresher training and a sufficient number of reserves will be earmarked to bring their complements to full strength in time of war or national emergency.

Problem

To determine whether or not the Navy shall operate and continue development of lighter-than-air craft in the post-war period.

Decision

At the end of the war the Navy will discontinue its lighter-than-air program and dispose of all airships and lighter-than-air facilities not required for continued development on a laboratory scale.

Discussion

Arguments for and against naval sponsorship of a lighter-than-air program have continued for the past two decades. Before Pearl Harbor that program was practically suspended. During the war small scale lighter-than-air operations were undertaken and proved of some value in the Atlantic anti-submarine campaign. Airships were not used in the Pacific except in minor coastal patrol. There, because airships of the size and numbers believed necessary by proponents of this program were not in existence, their war value was not tested.

It appears probable that heavier-than-air craft can meet all of the foreseeable aeronautical needs of the Navy. Because of the doubtful value of airships, and because of probable budget limitations the Navy should not sponsor the operation of lighter-than-air craft. Development of those craft should be continued on a laboratory scale only to the extent necessary to keep abreast of possible new discoveries affecting this part of aviation.

Problem

To determine how the small boat needs of the Fleets for handling personnel and stores can be met.

Decision

Small boats, except lifeboats, will not be provided for combatant vessels. Boat pools to handle personnel and stores will be maintained at locations where major fleet forces usually operate. LSDs and LSTs will transport small boats to various locations to meet needs in excess of local facilities. Auxiliaries will carry sufficient small boats to accomplish their logistic tasks.

Discussion

Prior to this war all Naval vessels carried on board sufficient small boats to meet their needs for transporting personnel and stores. To expedite and facilitate the handling of stores, ammunition, and fuel Navy lighters and barges were employed at major Naval activities. Contractors' equipment was used also. "Water taxis" were permitted as a matter of convenience.

Because of military necessity all small boats were removed from combatant ships, except for one or two lifeboats. These boats cannot be replaced in most cases because of structural changes to the ships. The boats themselves may be generally unfit for return to ships unless given major overhaul. Moreover, small boats were not built for many combatant units. Combatant ships in active status are to be ready for any emergency at all times. It is unwise to revive small boats for these ships even though it might be possible in some ships without disturbing their armament.

Needs can be met in three ways: (1) transport small boats on auxiliaries accompanying the Fleets from anchorage to anchorage; (2) maintain pools of small boats at Naval anchorages; and, a combination of (1) and (2).

To maintain enough small boats at all Naval anchorages would be extremely wasteful. But it does seem feasible and desirable to maintain pools at such major operating localities as Norfolk, New York, San Pedro, San Diego, Pearl Harbor, etc. These should be ample to handle normal needs. However, during Fleet concentrations additional small boats will be required.

Large numbers of vessels will anchor at such out-of-the-way places as Pacific atolls. These are not "liberty ports" but there will be necessity for considerable boating. It seems most economical to transport small boats

to these places for temporary use rather than to maintain pools.

LSDs and LSTs are readily convertible to transport small boats for fleet needs, and it would be possible to arrange fleet schedules so that their cargoes of small boats will be available when and where needed.

Where economical, contractors' equipment should be employed.

The pre-war arrangements of providing lighters and barges to service the Fleets should be continued.

Auxiliaries employed in the logistic support of combatant vessels should be provided with sufficient small boats to enable them to supply the small boat needs of their tasks.

Small boats now owned by the Navy in excess of requirements of the Decision (above) should be disposed of.

Problem

Repatriation of the war dead.

Decision

War dead will be repatriated after the war when so requested, in each case, by the next of kin.

War dead not repatriated will remain in national military cemeteries overseas.

Repatriation operations will be the responsibility of the American Graves Registration Service of the Army.

Discussion

This is a joint problem and the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be expected to issue an appropriate directive.

J.C.S. Policy Memo 12, dated 16 February 1945, covers the policy of disinterment and reinterment of bodies outside the continental limits of the United States. In that Memo it is inferred that there will be repatriation of the dead after the war, and a directive has been issued to Theater and Area Commanders to facilitate that project by suitable concentration of remains during the war.

The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, has within its purview the burial of naval dead. Likewise, the Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, has within its purview the burial of marine dead. These agencies will continue their present responsibilities and duties insofar as the initial burial of dead of the naval service is concerned. Thereafter, disinterment and reinterment during this war; outside of the continental limits of the United States, is a responsibility of the American Graves Registration Service of the Army (The Quartermaster General). The Navy cooperates fully with this service. In repatriation operations the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and the United States Marine Corps will cooperate fully with the graves registration service.

It will be noted that there will continue to be necessity for funds for the care of naval dead, and that repatriation operations are entirely separate and distinct from initial burial.

It is impossible at this time to estimate the numbers of American dead who will be repatriated. And, in many cases it will be difficult, if not impossible to identify remains upon disinterment. However, the Navy must be prepared to determine the desires of all next of kin in this respect, and to furnish the Quartermaster General with appropriate information.

Problem

The determination, nature and extent of post-war medical care and hospitalization of dependents.

Decision

Medical care shall be provided for bona fide dependents of active and retired members of the U. S. Navy at government expense.

Hospitalization shall be provided for bona fide dependents of active and retired members of the U. S. Navy, provided that dependents shall reimburse the government at the rate of \$3.75 per diem.

Discussion

Dependents are now provided with this medical service by act of Congress.

The procedure for hospitalization is set forth in Appendix D, Manual of the Medical Department, U. S. Navy (Bureau circular V, par. 25). Instructions for other medical care has been deleted from that Manual.

Adequate medical service for dependents has, and will continue to be, a strong incentive for officers and men to make the Navy their career. It is more than an amenity; it is, both by law and custom, an obligation. The possibility that it will be difficult to retain sufficient personnel in the Medical Corps in the post-war period is insufficient to disregard this obligation. This project will require medical personnel and facilities above the requirements of members of the Navy for which funds must be appropriated by the Congress. In presenting budgetary requirements care must be taken to insure that medical service for dependents will in no way preclude adequate medical services for the officers and men of the Navy.

The Navy should collaborate with other government agencies to use existing personnel and facilities fully, and to avoid wasteful duplication. This is especially important at outlying activities where no adequate civilian medical services are available.

The first obligation is to dependents of members of the regular Navy. There may also be obligation to dependents of reservists on active duty. But practical considerations seem to preclude their inclusion. Aside from the administrative difficulties, consideration should be given to possible abuse by reserve dependents. If any care at all is provided this group by the government, it should be by some other agency than the Navy.

Problem

To determine the nature and extent of naval support of, and relation to commercial aviation.

Decision

Commercial aviation is part of air power. As such, it should receive naval support by making available naval facilities to commercial aviation, and assisting in air research and development.

Discussion

At the outbreak of this war commercial aviation was still in its infancy. But that infant has been able to make notable contribution to the war effort. During the war commercial aviation has been unable to develop anywhere nearly as fast as military aviation. This is due to military demands made upon the industry, and the military utilization of the great bulk of aviation personnel, airplanes, and equipment. Also, both the Army and Navy have engaged in air transport on a vast scale, some operations being in the normal field of commercial aviation.

Great strides have been made in the art of aviation during the war and most of the military developments will find ready application to post-war commercial needs. Given proper support by a sympathetic government there is every prospect that commercial aviation of the future will become a most important auxiliary of national air power and invaluable to the armed forces in case of war.

Commercial aviation will be up against the stiffest sort of post-war competition. We may expect other nations to give all sorts of direct and indirect support to their nationals. All of the techniques which were used in fostering foreign merchant marine will be revived, brought up-to-date, and applied. To meet this competition, our commercial aviation industry will require every government help consistent with the principles of private ownership and individual initiative.

At the end of the war, the U.S.A. will have air bases and other aviation facilities throughout the world. These going concerns will be greatly in excess of military requirements. Some, on foreign territory, will be turned over to the nations where situated. Others will be abandoned because they are of no further military or commercial value. The majority retained by us will be wholly or in part available for commercial needs. There should be no hesitancy on the part of the Navy in making available to

commercial aviation its excess of airplanes and aviation facilities. These would, of course, revert to the Navy if the military situation so required, and civilian developments should not be such as to preclude further military use.

While the Navy cannot make final decision as to whether or not our naval aviation facilities on foreign soil can be made available to our airlines, it should support commercial desires in this respect on the basis of future military requirements.

The Navy must refrain from supporting any one domestic aviation company or airline against another. To avoid favoritism, it must deal with the industry as groups - operators, manufacturers, labor, etc. Naval facilities, airplanes, developments, etc. must not be restricted to any one enterprise in the industry, but must be made simultaneously available to all.

The Coast Guard will maintain most aids for air navigation in peace time. All assistance which the Navy can give in this respect should be of ultimate value to the Navy.

The Naval Air Transport services should be eliminated wherever commercial aviation can be induced to provide adequate service. The possibility of commercial aviation providing service for the Navy by contract where it would not pay as a purely commercial venture should be investigated.

Problem

To determine the nature and extent of naval support of and relation to the merchant marine.

Decision

The merchant marine is a part of sea power. As such, it should receive naval support in every way possible.

Discussion

At the end of this war the merchant tonnage flying the American flag will be by far the greatest in the world, and will be far in excess of shipping requirements. But in spite of adequate tonnage and competent personnel, steamship lines will have great difficulty in meeting foreign competition. Our merchant marine laws and our labor policies will increase operating expenses greatly over competitors not so handicapped. Whether or not some form of government subsidies will be provided to meet this competition remains to be seen.

In case of war the Navy must look to the merchant marine to supply the required cargo and personnel life beyond naval capacity. It is expected that the Navy will only retain sufficient merchant type vessels to meet normal purely naval peace time needs. Some government agency will be required to maintain an inactive merchant reserve capable of rapidly meeting initial war logistic naval needs. This inactive reserve of ships, equipment, and personnel is essential to naval war time expansion and may well be considered a naval responsibility. In this connection, joint action is indicated.

So that the Navy will be better served by the merchant marine in time of war, there should be established a program of naval education and training for the merchant marine. This can best be done by making a naval merchant marine reserve attractive to merchant officers and crews.

The Navy should continue the policy of subsidizing merchant ship-building so that certain types can readily be employed fleet auxiliaries. For example, more speed for commercial tankers, deck strengthening for gun mounts, large evaporator capacity, large refrigerator capacity, etc.

The Navy can be of substantial assistance to the merchant marine in keeping that industry abreast of naval developments in certain applicable phases of ship design and maintenance and navigational aids. Probably it will not be possible for individual shipbuilders and operators to maintain adequate facilities for research in these fields, and the Navy--with the Coast Guard--

is the logical agency for this. The merchant marine should be encouraged to present its peculiar research and development problems to the Navy for solution.

On proper financial arrangements the Navy should make its excess repair facilities and equipment available to the merchant marine. By doing this at low cost, the Navy can help meet foreign competition.

At the end of the war the Navy will have a virtual monopoly on marine salvage experience, personnel, and equipment. After requirements of the Navy are met in this respect salvage facilities should be disposed of to American salvage operators.

Wherever possible the Navy should contract for the services of the merchant marine, rather than to maintain its own steamship lines. The Navy should not employ the BTS in fields served, or which could economically be served, by the merchant marine. This does not envisage the abolishment of the BTS in peace time as many naval activities overseas will be so located and otherwise found commercially uneconomical. Also, certain naval cargoes - explosives for example - will require naval handling.

It is essential that the Army and Navy establish joint policies regarding the merchant marine, especially in overseas transportation in order to eliminate wasteful duplication

Problem

To determine the essential features of the post-war new construction program.

Decision

To establish and maintain a long-range construction program in order to keep our Navy modernized and make possible industrial expansion to meet naval needs in time of war.

Discussion

A certain amount of new naval construction must be provided for (1) to keep the Navy from becoming obsolete (2) to foster the art of ship and aircraft building (3) to retain a nucleus of manpower skilled in ship and aircraft building. Of these, the most important is to maintain a Navy of the best that human ingenuity can produce. If this be done, there are many other advantages which will naturally accrue. We will then have the most modern and best Navy in the world, and our industry will have patterns for all necessary expansion in time of need. There is no other way that we can retain the necessary skilled designers and contractors, and fully exploit research and development.

In the post-war period there will be great difficulty in obtaining funds for new ship construction. Funds for new aircraft production will be easier to get because of popular appeal and because less money will be required. We will end the war with a modern Navy in every respect, but each day thereafter it will proceed toward obsolescence. There will be strong pressure to keep our Navy up-to-date by modernization. Unfortunately this cannot be done - our modernized units on December 6, 1941 were not fit for battle against their Axis opposites.

The scale upon which to determine priority of new construction is based on best estimates of rate of obsolescence. Obviously, at present aircraft become obsolete faster than any other naval weapon. Battleships, probably, are at the other end of the scale. There are many factors which must be taken into consideration in establishing construction priorities. A few are worthy of note.

The design and building of a new airplane ready for combat has been a very lengthy process during this war. In peace the time may be longer. For example, the B-29 took about four years to become a satisfactory combat plane. And during that time there was practically no limit of money, manufacturing facilities, and skilled workmen who could be employed on the project. Military aircraft are far more complicated than commercial types, and we cannot expect that progress

in post-war commercial aviation will be adequate to permit us to convert the peace time commercial industry into one capable of producing satisfactory military airplanes. Military and commercial aviation must go hand-in-hand, but the military must design, test, and produce those aircraft and equipment which are peculiar to combat. It may not be necessary or desirable to produce "a new model every year". It is only necessary that fleet aviation is not called upon to accomplish its mission against an enemy with superior aircraft and equipment. But to insure this research, design, and production for current needs must be continuous. Moreover, there must be complete planning for extremely rapid production of any satisfactory current type.

There is little need to build up an argument against naval ship construction holidays. Our experience after 1922 should convince even the most sceptical when viewed in the light of our probable position in the post-war world. Battleships, carriers, cruisers, submarines and destroyers retain their effectiveness much longer than other ships. They are expensive to build and operate, and because of this, and because they are of no direct commercial value, competition in production of improved types will be limited. But here again, you can't pick a modern battleship out of a hat when needed. The whole process of research, design, construction, and test must be continuous.

Most other naval types are capable of rapid production provided pilot types and plans are available. This is particularly true in landing craft. As with the others, however, research, design, construction, and test must be continuous.

Because the future of our Navy is now so indefinite in many respects it is impossible to decide on a firm new construction program. However, a program of percentages of annual fleet replacements shown below can be considered firm for planning purposes.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Percentage of the total tonnage in the Navy (active and reserve, but not inactive) replaced annually.</u>
Battleships, Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers, Submarines)	5%
Aircraft	25%
Auxiliaries	5%
Landing craft	10%
Other types	2.5%

Note: Obsolete, or definitely obsolescent craft are not considered in computing tonnage. For example pre-war battleships, even though in an active status, are not counted.

The Navy cannot undertake new construction for the merchant marine. However, it should actively encourage and assist the maintenance of an up-to-date and adequate merchant marine. The assignment of naval construction to private yards in the foreseeable future is essential, if that industry is to be capable of meeting naval demands in time of war or emergency. Also, the Navy must assist that industry by making available results of its research and development. This applies with equal force to the aviation industry.

An orderly and long-range new construction program which includes private production contracts will permit civilian producers of munitions of war to remain in that phase of their business for which there is little or no civilian demand. This, also, is essential to meet possible future naval needs.

There are two main goals to be achieved by new construction:

- (1) To keep our Navy modernized in order to be effective in the successful performance of assigned tasks.
- (2) To provide a nucleus for industrial expansion to meet war needs.